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Abstract 
Knowing in a discipline means not only knowing its products, and their uses, but also 
about the genesis of its knowledge, how that knowledge is warranted, and how contrary 
views are reconciled.  This shapes the entailments of teaching and learning of that 
discipline whether at age 8, 18, or 80.  This lecture will focus on the discipline of 
mathematics, illustrating what mathematicians do when they seek to “prove” a claim, 
taking note of the challenges presented by the advent of computer-based proofs. Proving 
is a fundamental mathematical practice, learned by few students, and then only late in 
their education.  I will consider how proving could shape the early learning of 
mathematics, including the use of “generic” proofs.  Examples from elementary 
classrooms will illustrate why the warrants for shared knowledge in a field matters for the 




Each discipline (or field of knowledge) presents us with theories, claims, and debates.  For 
example, quantum theories in physics, biology (evolution vs. intelligent design), meteorology 
(global warming - its existence, causes), history (the causes of the American Civil War), law 
(legal interpretations of the US Constitution), economics (institutional actions that can best 
intervene on the collapse of the global economy). 
To have a critical understanding of a discipline, it is not enough to know its products and their 
uses.  One needs to understand as well the genesis of its knowledge, how that knowledge is 
warranted or certified, and how, within the norms of the field, contrary views are reconciled, if at 
all.  Each field – physics, biology, medicine, linguistics, history, economics, law, theology, etc. – 
has its own versions of this.  And, as Joseph Schwab emphasized, this in turn shapes the 
entailments of the teaching and learning of that discipline, at every level.  
The genesis of knowledge generally begins with a focused exploration of some field of experience 
or of ideas, and expressions of creative insight or speculative generalization leading to 
hypotheses or conjectural claims.  The somewhat mysterious creative processes underlying such 
insights have been the subject of much reflective, but relatively undisciplined, writing, even by 
some of our greatest creative thinkers.   
My focus today is not on exploration and discovery, but on justification.  It is about the warrants 
for well-articulated claims, and about how a professional community agrees to certify the truth of 
such claims; in particular, about how it reconciles conflicting claims.  Each field has its own norms 
for certifying truth.  Mathematics has evolved a unique method – deductive proof – dating back 
to Greek antiquity.  That is the subject of my talk today: proof, as a theoretical concept; proving, 
as a fundamental practice of the disciplinary community; and finally, what substantial forms proof 
and proving might appropriately take in mathematics classrooms, even in the early grades. 
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Proof and truth in mathematics  
A mathematical proof is composed of a sequence of assertions of the form, “something is true 
because something else is true,” where the word “because” conveys some well-understood 
logical rule of inference, for example syllogistic.  But how does such a process get started?  In 
mathematics it starts typically from some set of axioms, i.e. statements taken to be assumed 
without further justification, plus definitions (the precise meanings of terms being used), and 
eventually also the products of prior proofs, which are not in practice required to be repeated 
when used to derive further conclusions. (Mathematics is thus hierarchical, building new 
knowledge on old).  Moreover, the system is assumed to be consistent, i.e. free of logical 
contradiction.  The mature notion of formal mathematical proof was finally achieved only in the 
early 20th century. 
Saying that a mathematical claim is true means, for a mathematician, that there exists a proof of 
it.  Notice then that a proof rests only on axioms and precise meanings and rules for the use of 
language and logical inference.  It thus makes no reference to extra-mathematical contexts or 
experience.  In this sense, mathematical truth, being purely analytic, is certain and permanent, 
thus making mathematical knowledge cumulative – nothing is discarded.   
But it is also in a sense “unreal.”  Einstein once said, “As far as the laws of mathematics refer to 
reality they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality.”  This 
contrasts dramatically with the natural sciences, wherein truth is empirical; it is derived from and 
applies to the experiential world.  It is therefore uncertain, and subject to being overthrown by 
new data.  A mathematician once described fundamental particle physics as a field in which the 
blackboard is periodically erased.  
But despite its “unreality,” it must be said that there is still something wonderful and mysterious 
about proof-based mathematical knowledge.  Wonderful, because such purely analytical 
reasoning can reveal often surprising truths of extraordinary depth, subtlety, and sweep.  
Mysterious because, as history has demonstrated repeatedly, such curiosity driven mathematical 
discovery and proof repeatedly produce concepts and structures exquisitely suited to model and 
understand the world of experience.  This is the “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics” of 
which the physicist Eugene Wigner spoke.   It is what prompts Mario Livio to ask, “Is God a 
mathematician?” Sidebar illustration of a proof: 
Claim:      Every whole number > 1 is a product of (one or more) primes 
 
Steps of the proof 
 
Logical justification 
1. If this were not true, then there would be a 
smallest number N for which it fails. 
Every non empty set of whole numbers has a 
least element.  This (intuitively obvious) fact is 
either part of an axiom system for whole 
numbers, or else taken here as part of prior 
established knowledge. 
2. Being a counterexample to the claim, N cannot be 
prime, and so N is a product, A x B, with A and B both 
whole numbers strictly between 1 and N. 
This follows from the definition of prime 
number, and the fact that a proper factor of a 
number is smaller than that number (prior 
knowledge). 
3.  Since A and B are both > 1 and < N, they cannot 
be counterexamples to the claim (of which N was, by 
choice, the smallest), and so A and B are each 
products of primes. 
This uses the hypothesis that N was the 
smallest counterexample, the defining 
characteristic of N. 
4.  It follows then that N  =  A x B is also a product of 
primes. 
The meaning (definition) and associativity 
(prior knowledge) of multiplication 
5.  This contradicts assumption #1, that N is a 
counterexample to the claim. 
 
6.  This contradiction shows that assumption #1, from 
which it was derived, cannot be true.  I.e. the claim 
cannot fail to be true, and so it is true. 
The system of arithmetic is assumed to be 
consistent (free of contradiction). 
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Certifying truth: What are mathematicians doing when proving?   
The truth of a mathematical claim rests on the existence of a proof.  Stated this way, such a 
criterion is absolute, abstract, and independent of human awareness.  This criterion is 
conceptually important, but practically useless.   
The practice of mathematics is concerned with  
ways to make its practitioners convinced of the existence of proofs. 
 
This is how mathematical truth is certified, in contrast with how it is defined.  Thus, while truth is 
absolute, certification is a social act of human judgment. Of course the standard way for 
certification to happen is for a mathematician to actually construct a proof, and exhibit it for 
critical examination by peers.  The rules for proof construction are sufficiently exact that the 
checking of a proof should, in principle, be a straightforward procedure.  However, formal 
mathematical proofs are ponderous and unwieldy constructs.  For mathematical claims of any 
reasonable complexity, mathematicians virtually never produce complete formal proofs.  Indeed, 
requiring that they do so would cause the whole enterprise to grind to a halt.  The resulting 
license in the practices of certifying mathematical knowledge has caused some (non 
mathematical) observers to conclude that mathematical truth is just another kind of social 
negotiation, and so, unworthy of its prideful claims of objective certainty.   
I think that this is based on a misunderstanding of what mathematicians are doing when they 
claim to be proving something?  Specifically, I suggest that: 
Proving a claim is, for a mathematician,  
an act of producing, for an audience of peer experts, 
 an argument to convince them that a proof of the claim exists. 
 
Thus, proving here is an act of producing conviction, i.e. of “making believe.”  Two things are 
important to note here.  First, that implicit in this description is the understanding that the peer 
experts possess the conceptual knowledge of the nature and significance of mathematical proof.  
Second, the notion of “conviction” here is operationalized to mean that:  
the convinced listener feels empowered by the argument,  
given sufficient time, incentive, and resources, to actually construct a formal proof. 
 
I have not seen this perspective publicly articulated quite this way, so I shall be interested to 
hear the reactions of my mathematical colleagues to this. 
Generic proof 
One particular form of proving in the above sense, one commonly used by mathematicians, goes 
by the name of “generic proof.”  This refers to a situation where an argument is formulated 
around a representation of a strategically chosen example of a claim, intended to support one’s 
intuition while following the reasoning.  But the argument itself appeals only to generic, rather 
than idiosyncratic, features of the example.  To illustrate this, consider the following claim: 
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For any whole number N, the sum of the first N odd numbers is N2 
Generic proof:  We can represent N2 as the number of cells in an N x N grid square.  Here is the 
case N = 10: 
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
 
On the other hand, we can build up the square by successively adjoining L-shaped figures, and 
the sizes of the latter are exactly the first N odd numbers. 
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
 
1 + 3 + 5 + 7 + 9 + 11 + 13 + 15 + 17 + 19 = 100 
Though the picture depicts only the case N = 10, the argument is generic, and many people will 
find it generally “convincing” in the above sense. In general, it is somewhat vague when such 
arguments cross the threshold from heuristic evidence to generic proofs.  So “generic proof” is 
not itself a rigorously defined concept. 
Generic proofs are especially common in emerging fields where the technical language and 
notation to facilitate the precise general articulation of ideas is not yet fully developed.  This is a 
condition pertinent to that of elementary classrooms, in which the language and tools of 
mathematical reasoning are not yet highly developed.  And so we can expect that generic proofs, 
which are decidedly more than checking a sampling of cases, might play a significant role in the 
development of early reasoning skills. 
Size, complexity, and technology 
Mathematical knowledge, being permanent and cumulative, has grown in size and complexity.  
This reflects itself in a corresponding growth in size, depth, and complexity of mathematical 
claims and their proofs.  The published proof by Andrew Wiles and others of Fermat’s Last 
Theorem reached over 200 pages of dense and sophisticated mathematical argument that was 
reviewed by a team of expert referees.   
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The classification of finite simple groups1 is a monument of 20th century mathematics.  Though 
relatively simple to state, its proof is decomposed into many major parts, separately executed by 
dozens of mathematicians around the world, and occupying more than 10,000 published pages. 
It is safe to say that no single human agent has inspected all of the details of this massive 
“proof.”  Some mathematicians have therefore expressed reservations about the level of 
certification of this result.  Efforts to simplify and conceptually unify the proof are now 
themselves the goal of major research projects.   
Some proofs manage to reduce a general claim to the checking of a finite number of cases.  
However, this number, though finite, and the complexity of the checking, may be so large and 
demanding as to be accessible only through the use of powerful computers.  Such situations raise 
serious new questions about the criteria for certification, since human agency has been removed 
from an important part of the process.  The first large-scale case of this was the proof by Appel 
and Haken of the Four Color Theorem: Any planar map can be colored with four colors.  A more 
recent example is the proof, by Tom Hales, while here at Michigan, of the Kepler Conjecture 
about sphere packings of space.  Just as human referees traditionally checked conventional 
proofs, we now need proof-checking software to certify computer based-proofs.  And, in turn, we 
need rigorous certification of the reliability of the proof checking software.  Major efforts by Hale 
and others, both technical and theoretical, are now underway to provide such reliability. 
Another interesting recent development is the notion of “zero-knowledge proofs.”  These are 
protocols now used in designing cryptographic security.  They permit an agent to reliably 
convince an interrogator that she is in possession of a certain piece of knowledge, for example a 
proof of a theorem, but without revealing any of that knowledge to the interrogator. 
 
What kinds of things do mathematicians prove?   
What kinds of mathematical claims do proofs prove? 
Some Types of Theorems Examples 
1. [G] Generality:  Something is true 
for all cases, in some domain beyond 
what is known. 
1. For any two odd integers, their sum is even. 
2. For any polygonal decomposition of a sphere, with V vertices, E 
edges, and F faces, one has V-E+F = 2. 
2. [P] Properties:  A particular 
mathematical object (or family of 
objects) has certain properties.  
Perhaps one can say that these 
properties actually characterize the 
object(s) uniquely. 
1. Every positive integer is a sum of four squares of integers.  (E.g. 
5 = 0+0+1+4, 15 = 1+1+4+9) 
2. The sum of the angles in a plane triangle is 180o. 
3. Positive numbers a ! b ! c are the side lengths of a right triangle 
if and only if a2 + b2  =  c2. 
 
3. [Eq] Equivalence:  Two apparently 
distinct mathematical objects (or 
families of objects) are in fact the 
“same” is some precise sense. 
1. The sum of the first n odd numbers is n2. 
2. The powers of 2 are precisely those whole numbers not 
expressible as the sum of two or more consecutive whole 
numbers. 
3. A teacup and a donut are (topologically) the “same.” 
4. The symmetries of an equilateral triangle and the invertible 2 x 2 
matrices over Z/2Z are the “same” group. 
4. [C] Classification:  This has to do 
with explicitly describing (by listing or 
parametrizing) all mathematical 
objects of a certain species, for 
example describing all solutions to an 
equation or problem.  Central to such 
questions is not only the specification 
of the objects to be classified, but 
1. The set of solutions to the problem,  
                  “I have pennies, nickels, and dimes in my pocket.  If          
                   I pull out two coins, how much money might I have       
                   in my hand?” 
             is {2¢, 6¢, 10¢, 11¢, 15¢, 20¢}. 
2. The set of “Pythagorean triples,” i.e. triples (a, b, c) of whole 
numbers such that a2 + b2  =  c2, can be rationally parametrized 
(in terms of rational points on the unit circle).   
                                               
1 Groups are a species of algebraic structure by which mathematicians formalize the concept of 
symmetry. 
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also making explicit what it means for 
two of them to be considered the 
“same” (or equivalent). 
3. There are exactly five regular solids (up to similarity):  the 
tetrahedron, cube, octahedron, dodecahedron, and icosahedron.    
(In contrast, there are infinitely many regular polygons there 
exactly one (up to similarity) each integer n " 3.   
4. The classification of finite simple groups is given by some 
discretely parametrized families, plus a finite list of “sporadic” 
groups.  
5. [Ex] Existence:  Showing that a 
certain kind of mathematical object 
exists, for example that an equation 
has a solution.  This has two forms: 
(C) Constructive  (methods to 
construct, or effectively approximate 
the solution are given); and (NC) 
Non-constructive (We are only 
assured of existence, without 
knowing how to produce a solution.) 
  (C1)    Every quadratic polynomial has a (complex) root,     
            given by the quadratic formula. 
  (C2)    Every non-constant polynomial has a complex root. 
  (C3)    Irrational numbers exist:  !2 is irrational (proved) 
  (NC3)  Irrational numbers exist:  The cardinal of the set of 
            real numbers is > the cardinal of the set of rational    
            numbers. 
   (NC4) Sometimes equations are shown to have finitely  
            many solutions, but without specifying any bound  
            on their size.  This makes it computationally  
            inaccessible to determine the set of all solutions. 
6. [I] Impossibility (Non-
existence):  A certain kind of 
mathematical object or process does 
not exist.  For example, and equation 
may have no solution.  Or there may 
be no way to construct a certain 
object with certain prescribed tools. 
1. There is no solution to 7 ÷ 0  =  x. 
2. There is no solution to the system of equations, 
         4x + 6y  =  10,       6x + 9y  =  12 
3. There is no general method, with straightedge and compass 
alone, to trisect an angle, in fact an angle of 60o. 
4. A regular n-sided polygon cannot be constructed with 
straightedge and compass if n is not a power of 2 times a 
product of distinct “Fermat primes,” i.e. primes of the form 2e + 
1, where e is a power of 2. 
5. For n an integer " 3 there is no solution in non-zero integers x, y, 
z of the equation, xn + yn  =  zn. (Fermat, Wiles) 
 
 
The teaching and learning of proof 
Deborah Ball and I have argued, along with Schwab, that the learning of a discipline 
must include some understanding of the genesis and warrants for its knowledge.  In the 
case of mathematics, this means learning about the nature of proof, and the practices of 
proving.  We view this not as a peripheral embellishment of the curriculum, but rather 
as a basic skill, to be learned by all students. It is a fundamental source of sense making 
in mathematics.  Further, we are persuaded that such learning must be developmental, 
starting in the early grades.  We are fully sensitive to issues of equity in American 
education, and that concern only strengthens our belief. 
Many will hear this as hopelessly romantic, and naively unrealistic.  How can 
mathematical reasoning in a third grade class be anything more than a caricature of 
substantive and authentic mathematical practice?  For example, these children cannot 
have any robust idea of even the concept of mathematical proof, so how could they be 
trying to convince classmates that a proof exists. 
Our view of such learning is this:  A guiding intellectual imperative in the instruction is 
embedded in questions that do make sense to children, like:  
“How do you know?” 
“How can you be sure there is not another solution?” 
“Does this always work?”  In all cases?” 
“What do other people think about Mary’s explanation?” 
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These kinds of questions can be applied to anything from the answer to a numerical 
computation to a conjectural pattern (numerical or geometric, for example) that a 
student has observed.  Now, you may rightly raise doubts, noting that children do not 
yet have the formalized resources to construct and articulate mathematically adequate 
responses to such questions.  In this sense, the instruction has to be a kind of 
“bootstrap” undertaking, in which students, while attempting to construct their best 
approximations of answers to questions like those above, are beginning to gain 
appreciation of the need and desire for knowing why, and of the need for “making 
believe,” for convincing others.  More than establishing claims, they are, at the same 
time, engaged in constructing, with guidance from the teacher, some of the foundational 
intellectual architecture of mathematical reasoning itself, so that they become 
progressively better equipped to provide more rigorous answers to the questions, and to 
evaluate the rigor of the answers of others. 
I can imagine that some of you hear this as impractically theoretical, and divorced from 
real teaching and learning.  On the contrary, these ideas were distilled from our very 
close study and analysis of actual instruction.  To make these ideas more concrete and 
vivid, I will conclude now by immersing you in the observation of a real classroom, 
wherein the above imperative, to answer, “How do you know?” prevailed, and wherein 
the following commitments were integral to the instruction: 
• To treat the mathematics with integrity. 
• To take student thinking seriously, and to make it an integral part of the 
instruction. 
• To treat the learning and growth of knowledge in the class as the work of an 
intellectual collective. 
 
The context of the video 
• A third grade class (ages 8 – 10). 
 
• Multi-cultural and multi-lingual  
 
• It’s January, middle of the academic year 
 
• Norms:  The children have already begun to internalize the need to explain why 
things are true, and to critically – and respectfully – evaluate explanations of 
their classmates. 
 
• When we see them, they have been studying even and odd numbers, noticing 
patterns 
 
• “Bernadette’s Conjecture:”   
When you add an odd number to an odd number you get an even 
number. 
 




Clip 1 (Jan 26):   You can’t prove Bernadette’s Conjecture 
Jillian & Shekira:  
- We were trying to prove that . . . you can't prove that Bernadette's conjecture always 
works 
- Because . . numbers go on and on forever and that means odd numbers and even  
numbers . .  go on forever and, um, so you couldn't prove that all of them work. 
 
This stunning assertion is at once insightful and revolutionary.  J & S rightly observe that  
Bernadette’s Conjecture is not just one, but rather infinitely many claims.  And so, it 
would be impossible to individually check all of the cases.  B’s Conjecture is an “infinitely 




- I think it can always work because I um tried . . . 18 of them, and I also tried a Shea  
number so I think, I think it can always work. 
 
Ogechi is still content to believe B’s Conjecture, having checked that it holds in the many 
cases that she checked.  Note that this is a type of empirical reasoning that is valid in 




- I think it could always work because with those conjectures, (she motions to several  
previously discussed and widely agreed-upon conjectures, posted above the chalkboard)  
we haven't even tried them with all the numbers that there is, so why do you say those  
work?  Well, we haven't even tried all those numbers that there ever could be. 
 
Lin expresses an interesting, almost legalistic, objection to what she sees as the logical 
inconsistency of Jillian’s & Shekira’s argument.  Lin does not say directly that the J & S 
argument is wrong.  Rather, she says that the same mode of reasoning would apply 
equally well to defeat several other conjectures that had previously been agreed to by 
the class, and in fact “published” as posters in the classroom.  So Lin is saying, in effect, 
if your argument is valid, then you should have objected on the same grounds to those 
previous conjectures. 
This is a pretty sophisticated piece of logical reasoning.  It illustrates a step in how the 
children are progressively constructing the collective norms of mathematical proving. 





Clip 2 (Jan 31):   Bernadette’s generic proof 
Bernadette reports at the board on a proof of her conjecture developed in her group.   
• She begins by drawing two strings of seven hash marks, separated by a + sign. 
• Then, working from left to right, she circles the hash marks by twos, until the 
seventh one circled alone, and likewise for the first hash mark to the right of the 
plus sign.  She continues to circle the remaining six hash marks by twos. 
• Then she draws an arc to connect the two individually circled hash marks. 
• This achieves a representation of the combined collection as grouped by twos, 
with none left over. 
 (||) (||) (||) (|) + (|) (||) (||) (||) = (||) (||) (||) [(|)+(|)] (||) (||) (||) 
      = (||) (||) (||) (|+|) (||) (||) (||) 
 
This drawing, which appears to show that 7 + 7 is even, is done without explanatory 
narrative.  When completed, Bernadette turns to the class, and never again looks or 
points at the board.  Moreover, her discourse to the class is entirely generic, with no 
specific reference to the numbers (7 and 14) depicted on the board. 
After fumbling a bit to get the wording straight, she says,  
 
“if you added two odd numbers together you can  
add the ones left over and it would always equal an even number.” 
 
Notice that she is talking generally about any odd numbers, not about the two sevens 
on the board.  Her verbal argument, unlike her drawing, is generic. 
What is it that permitted Bernadette to surmount Jillian & Shekira’s dilemma?  
Bernadette’s is using implicit definitions of odd and even numbers:  A (whole) number is 
odd if you can group it by twos with one left over, and it is even if there is none left 
over.  These definitions are themselves infinitely quantified, they apply to all numbers, 
and therefore they embody the capacity to support conclusions of similar purview. 
It is interesting to consider how older students, with algebraic resources, might have 
constructed a proof of Bernadette’s Conjecture.  It might for example rest on 
expressions of the form 
 (2x + 1) + (2y + 1) = 2x + 2y + 1 + 1 
    = 2(x + y + 1) 
where x and y stand for arbitrary integers.  It is instructive to appreciate how much is 
compressed in such very efficient and compact reasoning.  It is more than the use of 
symbolic expressions, and their algebraic manipulation.  The very use of the letters x 
and y here embodies the passage to the infinite, from the consideration of individual 
numbers to whole (infinite) systems of numbers, which are the range of possible values 
of x and y.  So infinite quantification is almost imperceptibly embedded already in the 
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use of symbolic variables, and so in particular in these algebraic expressions of evenness 
and oddness. 
Further, the multiplication, 2x  =  2•x stands for x + x.  This would correspond to a “fair 
share” definition of even number (two equal groups).  The “pair definition,” as a sum of 
groups of two, 2 + 2 + 2 + … + 2 (x twos), as used by Bernadette, would correspond 
algebraically to x•2.  But, by algebraic convention, we always put the scalar factor on 
the left.  Thus our algebraic notation already shrouds a distinction that remains 
mathematically significant for the third graders. 
It is because Bernadette did not have such algebraic notation at her disposal that her 
illustration of the argument was necessarily confined to a particular case.  In the 
absence of such notation, and of formalized definitions of even and odd, she was 
nonetheless able to compose a generic formulation of her thinking, and so construct 




Clip 3 (Jan 31, later):   Does Bernadette’s proof make you a believer? 
Teacher 
- Do people think that does prove that an odd plus an odd would always be even? 
- Lin thinks it doesn't because you wouldn't know about big, very big numbers. 
Lin does not accept the genericity of Bernadette’s argument, seeing it as only the proof  




- I don't think so (disagreeing with Lin), because she (Jillian) didn't say it had to be  
those two numbers, those two odd numbers.   It could be any two odd numbers  
because, um, there's always one left. 
 
Lin still insists that one can’t really know what happens for very large numbers, so large  
that they don’t even have names, and we don’t know how to think of them.  For these  
children, the infinite remains something still mysterious and beyond comprehension. 
 
Lin 
- I'm trying to say that that's only one example. You can't really say that it will work for  
every odd number, even-- I don't think it would work for numbers that we can't say or  
figure out what they are. 
 
Rania 




- ...Mathematicians can't even do that. You would die before you counted every number. 
 
Bernadette agrees that one could not check all cases.  But in her reasoning that  
is not an obstacle to her proof.  But Rania still disagrees: 
 
In summary, the generic proof offered by Bernadette has persuaded Jillian, but not yet  
Lin or Rania.  But the lines of disagreement have been clearly articulated.  The children  
are negotiating their norms for establishing conviction. 
 
